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CHAPTER 23 
Criminal Law, Procedure, and Administration 
J. EDWARD COLLINS 
§23.1. Right of arrested person to speedy examination. In the 
enforcement of federal criminal statutes, the arresting officer has the 
duty of taking the arrested person before a judicial officer for hear-
ing, commitment or the taking of bail for trial. Under the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure this must be done "without unnecessary 
delay." 1 The requirement that law enforcement officers show with 
reasonable promptness legal cause for detaining arrested persons, by 
presenting them before a judicial officer, has been characterized by the 
United States Supreme Court in McNabb v. United States as: 
an important safeguard - not only in assuring protection for the 
innocent but also in securing conviction of the guilty by methods 
that commend themselves to a progressive and self-confident so-
ciety. For this procedural requirement checks resort to those repre-
hensible practices known as the "third degree" which, though 
universally rejected as indefensible, still find their way into use. 
It aims to avoid all the evil implications of secret interrogation 
of persons accused of crime.2 
Arrests under warrant in accordance with Massachusetts statutes 
require the arresting officer to take the accused before a court or judi-
cial officer to be dealt with according to law.3 Neither statutes nor 
rules of court require, however, except in limited cases,4 that the pre-
sentment of any arrested person be made within any designated 
period of time, and no injunction is placed upon the arresting officer 
to do so promptly. The Supreme Judicial Court has recognized, how-
ever, that the arrested person is not completely without rights in this 
J. EDWARD COLLINS is Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. 
He is a former president of the Bar Association of Hawaii and former acting dean 
of the Catholic University Law School. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Theodore DiMauro 
and Mario Simeola of the Board of Student Editors of the ANNUAL SURVEY. 
§23.1. 1 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5. 
2318 U.S. 332. 344. 63 Sup. Ct. 608. 614. 87 L. Ed. 819. 825 (1943). 
3 General Laws. c. 276. §§22. 29. 34 provide for the issuance of warrants and 
summons for arrest. as well as for the examination of arrested persons. The sta-
tutes are silent. however. as to the time of these examinations. 
4 For example. C.L.. c. 272. §45 provides: "Whoever arrests a person for drunk-
enness shall make a complaint against him therefor at the next session of the court 
or of the trial justice having jurisdiction of the case; ... " See also G.L.. c. 272. §44. 
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§23.1 CRIMINAL LAW, PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION 151 
regard. In cases involving civil suits for false arrest or false imprison-
ment against the arresting officer, the obligation of speedy presentment 
has been clearly and emphatically stated. Thus, in Keefe v. Hart,5 the 
court stated that while the arrest was not improper, the defendant 
officers had the duty to take the plaintiff before a magistrate to deter-
mine whether there was ground to hold him. "The defendants had 
no right to detain the plaintiff to enable them to make further in-
vestigation of the charge against him. It was their duty to bring him 
before the court as soon as reasonably could be done." 6 How much 
time is contemplated within that expression is left undecided but the 
Court does state that "It cannot be said as a matter of law that their 
delay for an hour and a quarter was reasonable." 7 In the same vein 
is the language found in the earlier case of Tubbs v. Tukey 8 in which 
the plaintiff was arrested some time during Sunday. The Court 
stated, "1£ he [the arresting officer] had a legal right to keep the plain-
tiff in jail, during Sunday and Sunday night, yet he could be justified 
only by the necessity of the case, and so long only as that necessity 
existed." 9 
In marked contrast to these civil cases, the Court in criminal cases 
has failed to exhibit any such tender regard for the rights of arrested 
persons to reasonably prompt examination. In Commonwealth v. 
DiStasio,1° the arrest occurred about one o'clock in the afternoon, 
after the criminal session of the court was closed for the day, but while 
the civil session was still open. At three o'clock the arrested person 
was questioned and thereafter made a confession. The following day 
he was arraigned. While recognizing the rule laid down in the Tubbs 
and Hart cases, the Court tersely disposed of the question with the 
statement, "No undue delay was shown." 11 
During the 1957 SURVEY year, this problem was raised again in 
Commonwealth v. Banuchi.12 The defendant was convicted of mali-
cious burning and murder. He was arrested Sunday about midnight, 
but was not brought into court until Wednesday morning. During 
the interim period he made confessions, which he contended at the 
trial were inadmissible as involuntary because they were secured dur-
ing a period of unlawful detention. The Court found that the period 
of two days and nine hours was not unreasonable. The facts· indicate 
that the defendant may have been too drunk to have been brought 
before a court Monday morning. However, the lack of a Tuesday ap-
pearance is justified on the ground that "he was in the process of re-
cording the confession ... he had made early that morning." 13 
I) 213 Mass. 476, 100 N.E. 558 (1913). 
6213 Mass. at 482, 100 N.E. at 559. 
7 Ibid. 
83 Cush. 438, 50 Am. Dec. 744 (Mass. 1849). 
9 3 Cush. at 440, 50 Am. Dec. at 745. 
10294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936). 
11294 Mass. at 284, 1 N.E.2d at 196. 
121957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 497, 141 N.E.2d 835. 
131957 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 505, 141 N.E.2d at 840. 
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It is indeed startling to find that a practice frowned upon by the 
United States Supreme Court as "secret interrogation" constitutes a 
recognized justification in Massachusetts for failure to bring the 
arrested person promptly into court. It is hoped that the police will 
not take advantage of this decision and regard it as an open invitation 
J to elicit confessions during detention in order to justify a delay in 
judicial examination. 
On somewhat sounder ground is the Court's conclusion that the 
confession was not inadmissible solely because it was secured during 
a period of prolonged detention. While the United States Supreme 
Court has reached the opposite conclusion at a matter of federal law 
in the McNabb and following cases,14 the Massachusetts case of Com-
monwealth v. Mabey 15 supports the holding in the present case. The 
reason behind the principle appears to be that a confession so obtained 
is in the same category as other evidence obtained when, after interro-
gation, the police take the arrested person to locate the evidence be-
fore taking him before a judicial officer or to jail,16 This evidence is 
regarded as being in no different category than any other illegally ob-
tained evidence not inadmissible in Massachusetts courts for that rea-
son alone.17 
The Court also appears to be correct in finding that there was no 
violation of the federal due process clause in the securing and admis-
sion of the confessions. The facts of this case are clearly distinguish-
able, as the Court points out, from those of Fikes v. Alabama,18 in 
which other elements of coercion were present. 
Since the Supreme Judicial Court has been entrusted with the gen-
eral superintendence of the administration of justice in the courts of 
Massachusetts,19 it might have been hoped that greater concern would 
have been shown over this problem of lengthy detention before ex-
amination.20 Police do not hesitate to delay bringing an arrested per-
14 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943); 
Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 Sup. Ct. 170, 93 L. Ed. lOO (1948); 
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 77 Sup. Ct. 1356, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1479 (1957). 
15299 Mass. 96, 12 N.E.2d 61 (1937). 
16 In Commonwealth v. Mercier, 257 Mass. 353, 375-376, 153 N.E. 834, 841 (1926), 
it is stated: "The officer to whom the mittimus for the defendant was issued, instead 
of taking him directly to the jail, took him to different places where certain evidence 
was obtained which was used at the trial. The defendant objected to all evidence 
obtained in this way. But if it be assumed that the officer had no right under his 
mittimus to take the defendant to these places, still evidence thus obtained if 
otherwise admissible was competent." 
17 Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 246 Mass. 507, 141 N.E. 500 (1923); Common-
wealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N.E. II (1923). 
18352 u.s. 191, 77 Sup. Ct. 281, 1 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1957). 
19 G.L., c. 211, §3, as amended by Acts of 1956, c. 707, §l. 
20 The Executive Secretary appointed to assist the Supreme Judicial Court by 
virtue of the provisions of Acts of 1956, c. 707, filed his first annual report as of 
June 30, 1957. Very little contained therein pertains to the administration of 
criminal justice. Similarly the report of the Judicial Survey Commission, which 
immediately antedated the enactment of Chapter 707, is silent on the problem 
in its survey on the administration of criminal justice. 
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Ison into court; they use the period of delay for interrogation. There 
is a great temptation to use persuasive methods to secure evidence, and 
only doubtfully effective sanctions exist against the use of illegal means 
of obtaining it. Relegating the arrested person, whose recognized 
rights have been infringed by prolonged detention, to a civil suit for 
false arrest or false imprisonment seems somewhat less than satisfactory, 
particularly to one who, as a result of a confession so obtained, has 
been sentenced to life imprisonment as was the defendant in the 
Banuchi case. 
§23.2. Right to assistance of counsel. Article XII of the Declaration 
of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution states that every subject 
shall have a right "to be fully heard in his defense by himself or his 
counsel, at his election." By statute the court may assign counsel in 
capital cases if the defendant is unrepresented.1 Neither the language 
of Article XII nor that of the statute has been so construed as to re-
quire that an indigent defendant in a non-capital case be furnished 
counsel, irrespective of the severity of the crime for which he is indicted 
or the length of the sentence to which he is thereby exposed.2 
In Pugliese v. Commonwealth,s decided during the SURVEY year, an 
indigent, feebleminded person was tried without counsel for assault 
with a dangerous weapon with intent to rob, robbery and kidnapping. 
Equating the language of Article XII of the Declaration of Rights 
that states "No subject shall be ... deprived of his life, liberty or 
estate, but by ... the law of the land" with the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the 
Supreme Judicial Court set the verdict aside because it found that the 
defendant, incapacitated as he was, could not secure the fundamentals 
of a fair trial without representation by counsel. The Court analogized 
this case to the United States Supreme Court cases requiring counsel 
for incapacitated defendants, but the case is firmly based, and properly 
so, on the Massachusetts Constitution and decisions. 
This is a landmark case in the Commonwealth; it constitutes the first 
case in which the Court has reversed a conviction in a trial court for 
failure to furnish counsel in a non-capital case. This defendant had 
been in court some twelve or fourteen times in the past twenty-three 
years and thus came within the provisions of the Briggs Law; 4 the trial 
judge should have had sufficient information from the Department of 
Mental Health on the defendant's mental condition to indicate the 
necessity for assignment of counsel. In cases arising in which unrepre-
sented defendants do not come within the provisions of the Briggs 
. §23.2. 1 G.L., <:. 277, §47. This statute has been construed to require. rather 
than permit. the assignment of counsel in capital cases in which an indigent 
defendant is unrepresented. Commonwealth v. Dascalakis. 246 Mass. 12. 140 N.E. 
470 (1923); Commonwealth v. Millen, 289 Mass. 441. 194 N.E. 463 (1935). 
2 Allen v. Commonwealth. 324 Mass. 558. 87 N.E.2d 192 (1949); Commonwealth 
v. Blondin, 324 Mass. 564. 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949). 
3335 Mass. 471.140 N.E.2d 476 (1957). 
4 G.L.. c. 123. §IOOA. 
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Law, the trial court will henceforth have to be alert for indications 
of mental incapacity. An amendment to the Briggs Law, requiring 
automatic mental examination of all indigent and unrepresented 
criminal defendants, would provide a desirable certainty to aid the 
trial judge. 
Also a landmark in its peculiar way is Brown v. Commonwealth.5 
In the case of Allen v. Commonwealth,6 the Court, in finding no un-
fairness in the conduct of a trial of a non-capital case with defendant 
unrepresented by counsel, observed: 
Whatever may be the inherent limitations upon the assistance a 
trial judge can render to a defendant, it is nevertheless true that 
under the practice long prevailing in this Commonwealth con-
stant explanation and instruction as to his rights by the judge to 
a defendant on trial without counsel are far from perfunctory and 
are regarded as a sacred duty ... [which duty was] ... fully and 
painstakingly performed in this instance in accord with the best 
traditions of Massachusetts justice.7 
The Brown case presented a defendant, unassisted by counsel, being 
tried for armed robbery and assault and battery with a dangerous 
weapon. While the defendant was cross-examining a witness, the 
judge asked a number of questions of the defendant, including one 
as to how many guns he had in his possession at the time of his arrest. 
The defendant answered all questions put to him by the judge. At the 
completion of the case for the state, the defendant presented no evi-
dence, whereupon the judge, contrary to the usual practice in cases in 
which the defendant is unrepresented, required that the prosecutor 
argue the case to the jury. The judge then gave his charge, in the 
course of which he instructed the jury that, from the fact that the 
defendant didn't take the stand and testify as to whether he was the 
person involved in these alleged robberies and this assault, "no infer-
ence against him should be drawn ... because jurors might think that 
an honest man who had nothing to hide would be glad to come up 
here and tell his own story." 8 While the jury was deliberating, one 
of their number raised the question as to whether defendant had been 
given the opportunity to have legal counsel. On the jury's being re-
called, the juror was questioned by the judge concerning his inquiry, 
in the course of which the judge severely criticized the juryman.9 
Upon the guilty verdict being returned and prior to sentencing, the 
judge inquired about and considered charges of robberies against the 
defendant that were pending but untried. 
These events, said the Supreme Judicial Court, constituted such an 
accretion of judicial happenings, which could hardly have occurred 
Ii 11115 Mass. 476, 140 N.E.2d 461 (1957). 
61124 Mass. 558, 87 N.E.2d 192 (1949). 
7324 Mass. at 563, 87 N.E.2d at 195. 
8335 Mass. 476, 481, 140 N.E.2d 461, 464 (1957). 
9335 Mass. at 482, 140 N.E.2d at 465. 
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if counsel had been present, as to result in the defendant not securing 
the fundamentals of a fair trial. The trial judge's charge to the jury 
and his questioning of the defendant were also found to be violative 
of the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. 
The defendant was sentenced in May, 1952, for a term of a mini-
mum of five years; the decision of the Court reversing and setting 
aside the verdict was handed down in February, 1957. No extended 
comment is required on the unsatisfactory state of the law of the 
Commonwealth which so entrusted the constitutional rights of the 
unrepresented indigent defendant to the limited assistance of a trial 
judge performing his "sacred duty." 
In a third case involving lack of representation, Drolet v. Common-
wealth,lO no lack of due process was found when the defendant's 
counsel was absent from the courtroom during the closing arguments 
of counsel for a co-defendant and counsel for the prosecution, and 
during the judge'S instructions. The defendant was an adult not un-
familiar with courtroom practice, and the trial judge was not informed 
at the time that defendant's counsel was absent other than through 
prearrangement with his client. The Court, finding that the de-
fendant at the time of the trial was not surprised or disturbed at the 
departure of his counsel, likewise and properly appeared not to be 
disturbed. 
§23.3. Withdrawal of plea of guilty: Effect thereof. For many 
years Massachusetts has had a statute permitting a defendant to be 
convicted on his plea of guilty.1 In application, no exception has been 
made in cases involving the more serious crimes.2 When a guilty plea 
is made in the District Court, the defendant on appeal to, or on trial 
in, the Superior Court, may with court approval have his plea with-
drawn upon application. Court approval can be had if the judge is 
satisfied that the admission of guilt was inadvertent and not volun-
tary or intentional.3 Nevertheless, despite the successful withdrawal of 
the plea and the substitution of a plea of not guilty, the original 
guilty plea is admissible in evidence against the defendant as an ad-
mission.4 In admitting the former plea as evidence, Massachusetts takes 
a position apparently contrary to that of the majority of American 
jurisdictions.5 
In Commonwealth v. Devlin 6 one of the defendants assigned error 
on the ground of the impropriety of the admission during the murder 
10335 Mass. 382, 140 N.E.2d 165 (1957). 
§23.3. 1 G.L., c. 263, §6; id., c. 277, §47. 
2 Commonwealth v. Chiovaro, 129 Mass. 489 (1880) (murder case in which a 
guilty plea was allowed). 
3 Commonwealth v. Crapo, 212 Mass. 209, 98 N.E. 702 (1912); Commonwealth 
v. Winton, 108 Mass. 485 (1871). 
4 Commonwealth v. Haywood, 247 Mass. 16, 141 N.E. 571 (1923); Common-
wealth v. Brown, 150 Mass. 330, 23 N.E. 49 (1889). 
5 For a collection of cases, see Annotation, 124 A.L.R. 1527 (1940). 
6335 Mass. 555, 141 N.E.2d 269 (1957). 
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trial of his guilty plea made in the District Court. In accordance 
with the established Massachusetts doctrine the admission of the 
earlier guilty plea was held not to be error. The case would not be 
significant in this respect except for the fact that it appears to be the 
first capital case presenting the problem in Massachusetts. 
A month after the Devlin case was decided an amendment to the 
General Laws became effective 7 which gives the judges of the Superior 
Court the power, within sixty days after sentence imposed without 
trial following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, to revoke the 
sentence and permit the withdrawal of the plea. Prior to this amend-
ment the power of the judge to revoke a sentence and permit with-
drawal of the plea ceased at the end of the sitting at which the sentence 
was imposed.s The amendment eliminates an unnecessary and un-
desirable technicality in the law, but it may be questioned whether 
the amendment accomplishes much practically. The defendant who 
successfully has his sentence revoked and plea withdrawn finds that 
the withdrawn plea will continue to haunt him as an important piece 
of substantive evidence tending to establish his guilt. 
§23.4. Admissibility of evidence of prior identification. The un-
reliability of the identification by witnesses of a defendant as the per-
petrator of a crime is one of the more serious and unsatisfactory prob-
lems connected with the trial of criminal cases. Every available safe-
guard should thus be employed to insure the accuracy of identification. 
When available, one means of checking an identification is to com-
pare present courtroom identifications with previous ones made by the 
same witness in police lineups or elsewhere. While the jurisdictions 
in the United States are about evenly divided as to the propriety of· 
admitting evidence of previous identifications, whether on a corrobora-
tive or other basis,! Massachusetts, after originally rejecting testimony 
of prior identification, now permits it either to corroborate a present 
identification or on cross-examination to test its reliability.2 This issue 
came before the Court in two cases during the 1957 SURVEY year. In 
Commonwealth v. Locke 3 the robbery and arrest occurred on a Friday. 
On the following Monday a witness identified the defendant in a 
police lineup. At the trial some fourteen months later the same witness 
was permitted to testify as to his identification of the defendant in the 
lineup. The Court held there was no error in admitting this testimony, 
stating: "An identification made in court frequently has little testi-
monial value as compared with a prior identification made in the 
circumstances here disclosed and such evidence ought to be admissible 
7 G.L.. c. 278. §29, as amended by Acts of 1957. c. 302. 
S Commonwealth v. Phelan, 271 Mass. 21. 171 N.E. 53 (1930). 
§23.4. 1 See Annotation, 70 A.L.R. 910 (1931). 
2 Commonwealth v. Powers. 294 Mass. 59. 200 N.E. 562 (1936); Commonwealth 
v. Rollins, 242 Mass. 427. 136 N.E. 360 (1922); Commonwealth v. Piper. 120 Mass. 
185 (1876). For the earlier view contra, see Commonwealth v. James. 99 Mass. 438 
(1868). 
3335 Mass. 106. 138 N.E.2d 359 (1956). 
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to corroborate the identification in court." 4 A police stenographer was 
also permitted to testify that he was present at the lineup when the 
witness identified the defendant and that the witness then made a 
statement that the defendant was one of a group of three men he saw 
running along the street of the robbery shortly after its occurrence. 
The Court held that this testimony was properly admitted. 
In Commonwealth v. Roselli,5 another robbery case, the principal 
issue was the identification of the defendant as one of the robbers. 
There was evidence that the chief witness for the prosecution first 
identified the defendant in a police lineup some seven years after the 
robbery. She also identified him at the trial. She had appeared at 
several lineups at which one Conroy appeared. Her testimony was 
that she did not identify Conroy as one of the robbers. A police chief 
then testified for the prosecution that he had taken the witness to two 
lineups at which Conroy appeared; on cross-examination he testified 
that the witness had pointed out Conroy at one lineup. Counsel for 
defendant then asked whether Conroy was indicted as a consequence 
of the witness's identification. The Court found the question properly 
excluded as not being within the personal knowledge of the witness. 
Conroy was then called by the defendant and testified that the witness 
had identified him. The trial court refused to permit Conroy to be 
questioned as to whether, as a result of this identification, he was in-
dicted for the same offense as that charged to the defendant. The 
Court held there was no error since the fact of any indictment of Con-
roy following his identification could add nothing to the previous 
testimony of the erroneous identification. Undoubtedly the Court was 
correct in this conclusion, the important thing being the unreliability 
of the identification rather than the previous consequences of it. 
§23.5. Admissibility of evidence of blood-grouping tests. In Com· 
monwealth v. Stappen 1 the defendant was indicted for failure to sup-
port his wife and two children. He filed a pre-trial motion for a blood 
test of all parties under the provision of G.L., c. 273, §12A, which 
directs the court to order such tests of the mother, child and defend· 
ant in paternity cases. The motion was opposed. The trial judge re-
ported to the Supreme Judicial Court the questions of (1) whether 
the provisions of Section 12A are applicable to non-support cases, and 
(2) whether blood type evidence is admissible in a non-support case 
in which the children involved were born during wedlock. The Court 
answered the first question in the negative and second in the affirma-
tive. The Court held that evidence of paternity exclusion, such as 
blood tests, overcomes the presumption of legitimacy of children born 
during wedlock. 
Left unquestioned and undecided in the case is whether a trial 
judge has the power to order blood tests in criminal proceedings, in 
4335 Mass. at ll2. 138 N .E.2d at 364. 
5335 Mass. 38, 138 N.E.2d 607 (1956). 
§23.5. 11957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 815, 143 N.E.2d 221. 
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the absence of a statute authorizing him to do so. In the past quarter 
of a century blood tests have become increasingly important not only 
in cases involving paternity but also in cases that involve crimes of a 
bloody nature, in which identification or exclusion by blood type has 
been significant. Many jurisdictions have enacted legislation specif-
ically authorizing these tests.2 In others, the courts have proceeded 
under general statutes 3 or rules of court 4 permitting the court to order 
physical examinations of the parties. In the absence of any statute or 
rule, the inherent power of the trial court to order these tests has been 
recognized.6 
With the reliability of blood tests now generally recognized, it is 
unfortunate that the Court in the Stappen case did not have the op-
portunity to consider and resolve the question in this jurisdiction. 
There is no sound reason why these tests should not be available in 
appropriate cases, even as are the universally accepted tests for the 
determination of the alcoholic content in blood. If the courts have 
the inherent power in this state to order these tests, they should not 
hesitate to do so under proper safeguards. If they do not have this 
power, which seems doubtful, then appropriate legislation should be 
provided. 
2 See Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, adopted in California. 
Michigan. New Hampshire and Oregon. See also N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A:83-3. inter-
preted in Anthony v_ Anthony. 9 N-J- Super. 411. 74 A_2d 919 (1950)_ 
3 See N_Y. Civil Practice Act §306-a. interpreted in Anonymous v_ Anonymous. 
1 A.D_2d 312. 150 N.Y.S.2d 344 (2d Dept. 1956). 
4 Fed. R. Civ. P,35. No such provision appears in the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
6 See State v. Eli. 62 N_W.2d 469 (N.D. 1954). 
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